MIL-STD-1822 Nuclear Compatibility Certification Of Nuclear Weapon Systems, Subsystems And Support EquipmentThis document describes standard practices for nuclear compatibility certification of nuclear weapon systems excluding nuclear facilities. Nuclear weapon system compatibility certification authority is derived from the 1953 Atomic Energy Commission AEC/Department of Defense DoD Memorandum of Agreement MOA and restated within numerous DoD and Air Force AF directives.

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MIL-STD-1822A(USAF) APPENDIX B

Office/Contractor,  or  ICBM/NCM)  will  identify  Technical  Orders  or  other technical publications that will require nuclear certification (FIGURE B-1, Block 3).

(2) The  AFNWC/NCLS  is  responsible  for  procedures  which  involve  nuclear weapon  loading,  weapons  delivery  and  aircraft  operations,  handling, movement,   restraint   configuration,   loading,   unloading,   testing   and delivery.

(3) The ICBM/NCM is responsible for ICBM related technical data related to

OPCERT/DECERT procedures, missile maintenance, etc.

(4) The appropriate Program Office's TOMA is responsible for nuclear related procedures not identified above.

d.   The Lead/Using Command (MAJCOM) will:

(1) Review the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement to determine if there is any  impact  on  the  Operational  Certification  (see  FIGURE  B-1,  Block  4) components  that  would  necessitate  the  need to engage the  operational element of the nuclear certification process.

(2) Determine which elements, if any, of the Operational Certification process need  to  be  accomplished  based  on  the  complexity  of  the  development effort.  The MAJCOM should examine the impact the modification or new development  has  on  personnel  task  qualification  training,  Personnel Reliability  Program  (PRP),  and  nuclear  surety  training  requirements  to determine if the development and deployment of the modification or new system requires conducting an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection before the unit can assume its operational tasking.   This latter determination should be made in coordination with the Air Force Safety Center.

e.   Generally, the Operational Certification process would be required when:

(1)  A new nuclear mission (e.g., new delivery system or nuclear weapon) is being assumed by an already nuclear certified unit.

(2)  A non-nuclear certified unit assumes or resumes a nuclear mission. (3)  New or significantly modified maintenance or operational procedures,

maintenance facility, or item of support equipment is introduced to an

already nuclear certified unit.

(4)  Certifying of a unit assigned a contingency mission that is now required to be operationally nuclear certified.

f.        Operational Certification would normally not be required when the proposed action does not affect the current operational certification status of the operating units (i.e., no new training requirement or need to conduct an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection).

g.   If the MAJCOM determines that Operational Certification is not necessary, the MAJCOM will   submit   written   notification   to   the   AFNWC/NCS   Certification   Organization   that Operational Certification is not impacted following the MAJCOM review of the NCIS.

h.   The  AFNWC/NCS  Certification  Organization  will  coordinate  the  Basic  Certification Requirements Plan among all the process owners to ensure the plan and its appendices accurately  capture  the  process  owner  requirements.   Once  the  process  owners  have coordinated on the BCRP, it will be forwarded to the Single Manager.

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