MIL-STD-1822 Nuclear Compatibility Certification Of Nuclear Weapon Systems, Subsystems And Support EquipmentThis document describes standard practices for nuclear compatibility certification of nuclear weapon systems excluding nuclear facilities. Nuclear weapon system compatibility certification authority is derived from the 1953 Atomic Energy Commission AEC/Department of Defense DoD Memorandum of Agreement MOA and restated within numerous DoD and Air Force AF directives.

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MIL-STD-1822A(USAF)

nuclear  weapons  are  indeed  compatible  with  the  nuclear  bombs/warheads.   SNL  personnel work  with  the  Air  Force  and  their  contractors  to  ensure  that  electrical,  mechanical,  and aerodynamic   compatibility   certification   requirements   are   fully   understood,   and   are   full participants   in   conducting   required   compatibility  certification  testing,   demonstrations,   and analyses.    At  the  conclusion  of  an  aircraft/missile  compatibility  certification  program,  SNL updates  the  Aircraft  Compatibility  Control  Drawing  (ACCD)  for  aircraft  or  the  Compatibility Certification  (CC)  Drawing  for  cruise  missiles  for  inclusion  into  the  Major  Assembly  Release (MAR).

4.6.4    Lead/using MAJCOM.

The  Lead  Command  is  the  MAJCOM  that  serves  as  the  operators'  interface  with  the  Single Manager for a weapon system (i.e., Air Combat Command for the B-2 and F-15).   The Using Commands are the MAJCOMs that operate the weapon system, subsystem or equipment item (i.e.,   USAFE   for   F-16s   and   F-15s).     HQ   USAF   designates   operational   commands   or organizations  authorized  to  conduct  or  participate  in  operations  or  operational  testing.    In addition  to  all  other  testing  and  analysis,  the  responsible  MAJCOM  determines  if  a  system requires  further  testing  of  the  release  interface  with  the  weapon  delivery  vehicle.    If  flight clearance or safe separation test and analysis are required, the MAJCOM conducts tests and submits test data to the Air Force SEEK EAGLE Office (AFSEO) and the appropriate System Program Office.

4.6.5    Air Force SEEK EAGLE Office (AFSEO).

The  Air  Force  SEEK  EAGLE  certification  program  determines  safe  upload  and  download procedures,  flight  limits  for  safe  carriage,  employment,  jettison,  safe  escape,  and  ballistic accuracy for  all nuclear weapons and for  associated suspension equipment, tanks,  and pods carried internally or externally on the aircraft.   The AFSEO will initiate updates to appropriate aircraft  technical  orders  and  flight  manuals  as  a  result  of  their  activities.    Recertification  is required for any change which alters the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft or store, and ejection characteristics of the suspension equipment.

4.6.6    Test Squadrons.

Various flight test and evaluation organizations including the 49th  Test & Evaluation Squadron,

72nd   Test  Squadron,  576th   Flight  Test  Squadron,  and  the  Air  Force  Operational  Test  and

Evaluation  Center  (AFOTEC)  provide  additional  assistance  to  the  AFSEO  when  operational testing  aboard  an  aircraft  platform  (such  as  AMAC  testing,  follow-on  VFA  testing,  etc.)  is

required.

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